USTH Innovation · Session 4 · Course Review, pp. 92–142

Diffusion & Innovation Systems

From S-curve adoption to running an Innovation Management System — and the four assignments that go with it

1 · Innovation Diffusion

What is innovation diffusion?

Definition. Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels, over time, among members of a social system. It is distinct from invention (creating something new) and innovation (bringing it to practical use) — diffusion is what happens after that, as the market actually adopts it.

The S-Curve of Diffusion

Three phases, one curve

Growth Time Phase 1: Emergence high cost, high uncertainty Phase 2: Growth / Take-off inflection point, rapid capture Phase 3: Maturity / Saturation needs a new S-curve next
Worked example from the lecture

The S-curve in Vietnam: smartphone adoption

Phase 1: Emergence (2008–2010)

slow start, market penetration

First smartphones (original iPhone, early Android HTC) appear in Vietnam. Devices are very expensive, 3G is in its infancy, most people still use "brick phones."

Phase 2: Growth (2012–2018)

explosive, mass adoption

Affordable Xiaomi, Oppo, Samsung A-series phones flood the market. Nationwide 3G/4G plus Zalo, Facebook, Grab make a smartphone a necessity for nearly everyone.

Phase 3: Maturity (2020–present)

saturation and stability

Almost every adult owns a smartphone. Few first-time buyers remain; competition shifts to the high end, or to the next upgrade cycle.

Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations

Five adopter categories

2.5%Innovators13.5%Early Adopters34%Early Majority34%Late Majority16%Laggards
Tidd & Bessant

5 attributes that drive the rate of adoption

1. Relative Advantage

Is it significantly better than existing solutions — on price, speed, convenience?

2. Compatibility

Does it fit existing values, habits and technical infrastructure?

3. Complexity

Is it hard to understand or use? Higher complexity → slower adoption.

4. Trialability

Can users experiment with it on a limited or free basis first?

5. Observability

Are the results and benefits easily visible to others?

2 · Innovation System

The core process: Search → Select → Implement → Capture Value

Searchscan for signals, threats,opportunitiesSelectstrategic choice: risk,resources, fitImplementR&D, design, prototype,launchCapture Valuecommercialize, scale,acquire value
The innovation space

The "4Ps" of innovation

INNOVATION Product what we offer Process how we make/deliver it Position who/where we sell to Paradigm the mental model / business model
Lecture examples

One company, four kinds of innovation

Product

Evolution of the Mouse

1964 wooden first mouse → 1970s–80s Xerox/Apple models → 1980s–2000 mechanical → 2000s–present wireless.

Process

Ford's assembly line

Robotic welding and moving assembly lines changed how cars are built, not what a car is.

Position

Apple Watch

Launched as a convenient wearable, later repositioned primarily as a health- and fitness-tracking device for a different buyer.

Paradigm

Netflix

From mailing DVDs to a streaming subscription business — a new business model, not just a new product.

3 · Levels of an Innovation System

No firm innovates alone

Firm-Level (Internal)

  • Strategy: clear intent, supportive leadership
  • Flexible, agile structure
  • Culture that rewards creativity
  • Learning from success and failure

Inter-Organizational

networks & ecosystems
  • Open innovation: internal + external sources
  • Supply chains & alliances, university partnerships
  • Ecosystems & platforms co-creating value

National & Regional

external environment
  • Institutional setup: universities, public R&D
  • IP protection, standards, policy
  • Venture capital, tax incentives
  • Local cluster dynamics
4 · Innovation Management in Enterprises

Why manage innovation at all?

The necessity

  • Align innovation with strategic direction, resources, metrics
  • Keep strategy flexible as opportunities change
  • Balance exploiting today’s process with exploring new ones
  • Remove barriers and mindsets that stifle initiative
  • Ground innovation in real market and customer needs

The roles it plays

  • Focuses the enterprise on its most critical innovation activities
  • Lets top management define a vision and allocate resources
  • Builds a shared, organization-wide awareness of innovation work
  • Surfaces bottlenecks through assessment
  • Integrates with the firm’s other management systems
Innovation Management Systems (IMS)

The fundamental elements, and 7 evaluation principles

4 fundamental elements

  • Context of the organization: internal/external issues relevant to objectives
  • Leadership: vision, strategy, policy, roles
  • Planning: activities that address opportunities and risks
  • Support: people, finance, tools, IP strategy

7 evaluation principles

  • Increasing value for the business
  • Challenging goals & strategies
  • Mobilizing business development
  • Focusing on the future
  • Relevance to context, best practice
  • Flexibility & comprehensiveness
  • Effectiveness & reliability
The ISO 56000 series

A global standard, built by 40+ countries

ISO 56000: IMS 8 Principles ValuerealizationLeader'sfuturevisionStrategicorientationInnovationcultureKnowledgeexploitationRiskmanagementAdaptabilitySystemsapproach
5 · Assignments

Four tasks attached to this lecture, numbered 1–3 and 5

#TypeWhat's required
1Analysis (in-class)Analyze the role of innovation management in enterprises, with illustrative examples.
2Group activity, 30–40 minPick a real product (EV, air fryer, GenAI tool, QR payments). Evaluate it on the 5 attributes, place it on the S-curve / adopter spectrum, propose 1–2 strategies to cross the chasm into the Early Majority.
3Homework (~300 words)Reflect on why a technologically advanced product failed during its diffusion phase.
5Presentation (graded)Full "Analysis of an Innovation" deck — 5-part structure, worked example provided (Selex Motors).
Assignment 5, the template

"Analysis of an Innovation" — 5-part structure

PartCovers
1. IntroductionTitle, problem statement, objective — why this innovation was chosen
2. OverviewProduct/model description, type of innovation (Product/Process/Position/Paradigm), level (Disruptive/Incremental/Radical), target users
3. Core AnalysisValue proposition, key success factors, market adoption evidence
4. Impact & ChallengesPositive impact, risks/barriers, full SWOT analysis
5. ConclusionSummary, key lessons applicable elsewhere, Q&A
Worked example in the lecture

Selex Motors: EV ecosystem & battery swapping

The problem

Grab/Be/ShopeeFood drivers lose 3–8 hours a day charging EVs; gasoline price swings raise costs further.

The solution

Selex Motors (founded 2018): smart EVs + standardized batteries + automated "2-minute battery swap" stations, Battery-as-a-Service.

Type & level

Product innovation (EV + battery) combined with Business Model innovation (BaaS). Disruptive — replaces passive charging and gasoline refueling habits.

Evidence of adoption

Hundreds of swap stations in Hanoi & HCMC; >90% driver satisfaction; drivers report 20–30% higher daily income from eliminated downtime.

6 · Worked Answers

Completing Exercises 1, 2, 3 & 5 — four different ways of thinking, one example each

#1 is causal analysis, the Grab case. #2 is a raw group brainstorm on QR payments, filtered down. #3 is a researched narrative on the Dvorak keyboard, with dates and names. #5 is a structured business case on VNeID, Vietnam’s national digital ID, with real figures — four different examples, deliberately, so no single running story does all the work.
Exercise 1 — slide 92

"Analyze the role of innovation management": the 5 official roles

Role of innovation managementWhat it means in practiceEvidence from Grab (detailed next)
1. Creating & sustaining competitive advantageNot a one-time edge — an edge that keeps renewing itself against copycatsEXP: hundreds of A/B tests a month keep fine-tuning matching/pricing on the same driver network — why no SEA rival, including Uber, could out-execute Grab on its own turf
2. Integrating technology, market & organizationTech alone, or demand alone, isn’t innovation — it has to be assembled into one working systemThe super-app flywheel: EXP (tech) + 47M monthly users (market) + licenses across 8 countries (organization) fused into one loop, each side feeding the others
3. Transforming ideas into real valueAn idea is worthless until it is actually captured as revenue, not just launchedGrabMaps: built in 2022 purely to serve Grab’s own drivers, later sold B2B. And 14 years from MyTeksi to Grab’s first-ever net profit, $200M in FY2025
4. Building & optimizing dynamic capabilitiesThe capability to keep re-tuning the business model as the market itself maturesIncentive spend deliberately cut from 13.3% of GMV (2022) to ≈10% (2024) while users kept growing 32.7M→47.2M — optimized, not accidental
5. Managing risk & optimizing resourcesScaling fast without scaling the firm’s exposure to fraud, regulation, or bad betsGrabDefense protected 4.5B transactions from fraud in 2024; years spent securing financial licenses market by market before launching GrabFin/GXS Bank
Exercise 1, deep case

Grab: resources only some founders start with

Family capital & domain expertise — verified

  • Grandfather Tan Yuet Foh co-founded Tan Chong Motor in 1957, Malaysia’s Nissan distributor; father Tan Heng Chew is its president
  • Anthony Tan worked as head of supply chain and marketing at Tan Chong before leaving in 2012 — real logistics-network experience, not a random MBA idea
  • Family motto per his own CNBC account: "you can sleep soundly when you are dead" — documented innovation culture (IMS principle 4) instilled before day one
  • His own retelling adds 5 years of hands-on factory work, welding and assembling seats — a self-reported detail, not independently verified beyond his interviews

Seed capital & the Select decision — verified

  • 2011: Harvard competition, 2nd place, $25k — judges said Malaysia alone was too small, think Southeast Asia — that comment became the actual regional strategy
  • His mother funded his first money ("I don’t understand, but I love you, so here is some money"); he added his own savings
  • MyTeksi launched Kuala Lumpur, June 2012; first institutional round, $2M+ from Vertex Ventures, June 2013
  • This is the Select stage of Search→Select→Implement→Capture Value, forced by outside feedback, not planned in advance
Exercise 1, deep case, continued

Grab: the three systems behind $22.1B in GMV

EXP: the Search→Capture loop, running monthly

  • Internal A/B-testing system: drivers/riders randomly split into groups, old vs. new matching or pricing logic compared on real outcomes
  • Hundreds of experiments run every month — fares and matching are continuously re-optimized on the same driver network, no new product launch needed
  • This is Capture Value treated as a repeatable monthly process, not a one-time launch event

The flywheel, proven in Grab’s own filed numbers

  • Incentive spend fell from 13.3% of GMV (2022) → 9.9% (2023) → ≈10% (2024), while monthly users grew 32.7M → 41.3M → 47.2M
  • FY2025 (filed Feb 2026): first-ever full-year net profit, $200M, on $3.37B revenue (+20%) and $22.1B GMV (+21%) — after losses of $485M (2023) and $158M (2024)
  • GrabMaps: built in 2022 purely to route Grab’s own drivers through motorbike alleys standard maps miss — then sold B2B once it worked. An innovation nobody set out to sell.
Exercise 1, deep case, closing the loop to Session 2

Grab: the same discipline, seen from the driver’s seat

Drivers organize

Facebook post from Thong tin Chinh phu, Sept 22 2026: Pham Mi Sen, Vice Chair of the Binh Tan Tech Motorbike-Taxi Union, speaking at an official meeting while wearing a Grab jacket

Sept 22, 2026: Phạm Mi Sên, Vice Chair of the Bình Tân Tech Motorbike-Taxi Union, speaks at an official meeting — the gig drivers Grab once empowered are now organized labor with a seat at the table.

Thông tin Chính phủ, official Facebook page. Photo: Hoa Lê.

Regulators review fees

Facebook post from Thong tin Chinh phu, Sept 12 2026: National Competition Commission reviewing Grab pricing and fee policy complaints

Sept 12, 2026: Vietnam’s National Competition Commission (UBCTQG) opens a review of Grab’s pricing and fee policy, and asks other ride-hailing apps for related information.

Thông tin Chính phủ, official Facebook page.
Exercise 1, deep case, the analysis

Why this is an IMS problem, not just PR

Sept 12–13, 2026: drivers in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and Da Nang organized a two-day app log-off, coordinated through a 166,000-member driver community group. Multiple outlets (VnExpress, Bloomberg, AsiaNews) report commission deductions in the 30–50% range, above Grab’s stated 20–27%; exact per-ride figures vary by source and are disputed. Documented prior rounds: January 2018 (commission 20%→23.6%) and December 2020 — this is at least the third cycle of the same dispute.

The evaluation-principle reading

  • 2025 is the exact year the 7 evaluation principles’ first item — increasing value for the business — finally succeeded (slide 20)
  • The same filings show no comparable discipline applied to relevance to context: the course’s own principle meant to weigh local stakeholder impact

The transferable lesson

  • An IMS optimized on one evaluation principle while ignoring another doesn’t fail quietly — it produces exactly this kind of headline
  • “Role of innovation management” therefore includes knowing which principle a firm is currently skipping, not just which one it’s winning on
Exercise 2 — the group activity

Chosen product: QR code payments in Vietnam

Share of daily transactions 2021 VietQR launched by NAPAS 2024 +106.7% volume YoY, ~2.1M outlets 2025 over half of all transactions cash: still ~30%, not zero
Exercise 2, the ecosystem

"QR payments" is not one app — it’s several, made to interoperate

NAPAS / VietQR

the switch + the standard

Vietnam’s national payment switch. Doesn’t hold consumer accounts itself — it’s the plumbing that makes a code generated by one bank scannable by any other bank or wallet.

MoMo

leading e-wallet

The most widely cited wallet brand (reported user counts vary by source, roughly 31–50M). Runs its own QR, cashback and vendor-onboarding programs on top of the shared standard.

ZaloPay & other wallets

the rest of the field

Built on Zalo’s existing messaging user base — the same "already-installed app" advantage Grab’s super-app strategy used, from Exercise 1.

Bank apps

MB, Vietcombank, TPBank, Agribank…

Most Vietnamese still hold their money in a bank account first. VietQR is what lets a bank app scan the exact same code as MoMo or ZaloPay, instead of needing its own closed network.

Exercise 2, step 1a — group brainstorm

Chosen product: QR payments. Raw ideas, compatibility & complexity.

Rule for this step: quantity over quality. 20 ideas, each tagged with the attribute it attacks, and marked ✅ already live in the market today or 💡 a new idea the group is proposing. First 10:

Exercise 2, step 1b — group brainstorm

Chosen product: QR payments. Raw ideas, trialability, observability & advantage.

The remaining 10 ideas — same legend: ✅ already live, 💡 new idea.

Exercise 2, checklist

All 20 ideas, compared in one table

9 of 20 are already live somewhere in the market — the group's real job is spotting the 11 genuine gaps, not reinventing what VietQR, MoMo or the banks already ship.

IdeaAttr.St.Already done by
National QR standard (VietQR)Compat.✅NAPAS, since 2021
Static printed QR on helmet/dashCompat.✅street vendors, xe ôm, today
ASEAN QR interoperabilityCompat.✅piloted, VN–Thailand/Cambodia
Offline/low-data fallbackCompat.💡—
USSD QR for feature phonesCompat.💡—
Bigger confirmation + soundComplex.✅most bank/wallet apps
Face-unlock to confirmComplex.✅standard biometric option
Voice-guided scan flowComplex.💡—
One-tap repeat paymentComplex.💡partial, saved-merchant lists
Cashback, first 10 paymentsTrial.✅MoMo, ZaloPay, banks
IdeaAttr.St.Already done by
Vendor onboarding kiosksTrial.✅MoMo/VNPay market drives
Zero-fee “QR Tết” campaignTrial.💡—
University QR-only canteen dayTrial.💡—
“Paid by QR” badge at stallObserv.✅ubiquitous stickers today
National adoption counterObserv.💡—
Public QR-market leaderboardObserv.💡—
No-fee small transactionsAdvant.✅VietQR P2P, typically free
Instant refund, failed scansAdvant.💡dispute exists, not instant
Loyalty points stack across appsAdvant.💡—, fragmented today
Chargeback-style protectionAdvant.💡largely absent today
Exercise 2, step 2 — filter and justify

Why these 2 beat the other 18

Filter rule: attack the weakest attribute first. The scorecard shows complexity and observability already strong — the real gap is trust (relative advantage) and reach into the remaining ~30% cash users (compatibility).

AttributeScore (VietQR, 2025)
Relative advantageMedium — fast and free for most, but failed/duplicate scans erode trust fast
CompatibilityMedium — ~30% of transactions are still cash, concentrated among older or rural users
ComplexityLow — scan and confirm, already simple
TrialabilityHigh — nearly free to try once
ObservabilityHigh — ~2.1M outlets already display a QR code
Pick 1: Instant refund flow for failed/duplicate scans

Directly repairs relative advantage, the real soft spot — one bad scan with no clear fix is what pushes a hesitant user straight back to cash.

Pick 2: Street-vendor onboarding kiosks with free QR stickers

Attacks compatibility exactly where the remaining 30% lives — informal vendors, not banked urban shoppers who already converted.

Exercise 3, part 1 — the researched reflection

Dvorak vs. QWERTY: the “better” keyboard that never won

Dvorakclaimed +74% fasterQWERTYbaseline1944 “Navy study” (run by Dvorak himself)Dvorakmatched, not exceededQWERTYbaseline1956 GSA “Strong study” (independently controlled)

August Dvorak patented his layout in 1936, redesigning it around letter frequency to reduce finger travel. The famous 1944 Navy study, run by Dvorak himself, claimed Dvorak typists became 74% faster and 68% more accurate. It is now considered unreliable — the 1956 GSA-commissioned Strong study, run with proper controls, found retrained Dvorak typists only matched their old QWERTY speed. They never beat it.

Exercise 3, part 2 — why "better" alone didn’t matter

Two separate failures, stacked on top of each other

Failure 1: the proof itself was flawed

  • Dvorak was the Navy’s own top expert in time-and-motion studies — he analyzed his own invention’s results, a textbook conflict of interest
  • Liebowitz & Margolis (1990) found the Dvorak and QWERTY test groups were not equally skilled to begin with
  • 1950s–1970s follow-up research consistently found little or no real advantage

Failure 2: switching cost, even if it had been better

  • Touch-typing is procedural memory — millions of trained typists, retraining is slow and risky mid-career
  • Every keyboard, keycap mold and typing-class curriculum was already built for QWERTY — a network effect, not a technology gap
  • This is compatibility failing for a totally different reason than EVs: not missing infrastructure, but locked-in human skill
Exercise 3, part 3 — the ~300-word write-up

Why Dvorak never diffused: the full reflection

In 1936, August Dvorak patented a keyboard layout redesigned around real letter frequency, placing the most-used letters on the home row to cut finger travel. On paper it was the more advanced product. Nearly a century later, almost no one uses it, and the reason is not only technology.

The first problem was the evidence itself. The best-known proof, a 1944 US Navy study, was designed and run by Dvorak — the Navy’s own leading expert in time-and-motion analysis — and reported startling gains: 74% faster typing, 68% fewer errors. Economists Liebowitz and Margolis later showed the test groups were not comparably skilled to begin with. When the US government’s General Services Administration ran an independently controlled follow-up in 1956, retrained Dvorak typists only matched their prior QWERTY speed. They never exceeded it.

The second problem was compatibility, structural in a different way than usual: touch-typing is procedural memory, built into the hands of millions of typists over years of training. Retraining was slow, risky to a working typist’s income, and every keyboard, typewriter mold, and school curriculum already assumed QWERTY. That installed base, not a conspiracy, is what economists call a network effect.

The lesson generalizes beyond keyboards: sometimes a challenger fails to diffuse not because the incumbent closes a gap, but because the evidence for the challenger’s advantage was never as solid as its proponents believed — and even a real advantage can lose to the sheer cost of relearning a skill millions of people already have.

Exercise 5, part 1 — Introduction

"VNeID: Vietnam’s National Digital Identity"

Problem statement: paper ID cards and in-person, agency-by-agency paperwork mean queues, duplicate data entry, and real fraud risk — and the pandemic needed a trusted digital credential immediately, not eventually. Why now: by mid-2025, over 62 million citizen accounts were already issued, with daily logins up to four times 2023 levels — this is no longer an optional app, it’s becoming mandatory infrastructure.

Exercise 5, the rollout

Diffusion forced sector by sector, by decree

12021COVID-era launchMinistry of Public Securitylaunches VNeID (Sept 10) forhealth declarations anddomestic travel during thepandemic22023Nationwide rolloutExpands beyond pandemic useinto a general digital-ID appfor citizens across thecountry32025Mandatory: banks & businessJan: biometric banking tied toVNeID. Jul: Decree 69 requiresbusinesses to use it fore-government services; foreignresidents need Level 242026Mandatory: platformsDecree 320 requires 12 sectorsof online platforms to linkaccounts to VNeID by Dec 31;opens to all legal foreignentrants Sept 28 Diffusion forced sector by sector, by decree — not earned attribute by attribute
Exercise 5, part 2 — Overview, with 2025 figures

Type, level, and who’s required to use it

2. Overview

Type: Paradigm innovation (replaces the citizen–government relationship itself: one verified digital identity instead of a paper card plus a separate login per agency) combined with Process innovation (procedures move online).

Level: Disruptive to a century-old paper-ID and in-person dossier system; rollout is incremental, sector by sector.

Two tiers: Level 1 (self-service in-app, limited features) vs. Level 2 (one in-person visit for biometric capture at a police station — still required for most mandatory services, the one friction point the mandate itself can’t remove).

2025–26, in numbers

  • Over 62M citizen accounts + 292M+ organization accounts (mid-2025); daily logins 3–6M, up to 4× 2023
  • PM Directive 24 (Sep 2025): 25 full-process public services moved onto VNeID; paper copies dropped for them from Oct 2025
  • 12 essential document types integrated per Resolution 66.22/NQ-CP; the 5 required for fee relief: birth certificate, bank/payment account, social-security account, phone number, e-health book
  • Fee relief from Aug 2026: 34 procedures 100% free, 8 high-value transactions cut 10–50%, for citizens with 5 core documents linked
Exercise 5, part 3 — Core Analysis, Impact & Challenges

Value proposition and SWOT

3–4. Core analysis, impact & SWOT

Value proposition: one verified identity, reusable across every agency and, increasingly, banks and platforms — fewer queues for citizens, less duplicate fraud-prone paperwork for the state.

  • S: quantified, not just adoption — by Sept 2026, 768,000 eligibility look-ups and 14,700+ fee-free dossiers saved citizens ≈232.6M VND directly
  • W: an account can be locked if its linked phone number isn’t registered in the citizen’s own name (Decree 320) — a mandate with a real lockout edge
  • O: a signed plan to link VNeID with Singapore’s and Laos’ ID systems, expanding across ASEAN — the "super app" ambition, moving
  • T: fake-VNeID phishing apps are real — one Đà Nẵng victim lost 129M VND (Jul 2025); police run a single verified hotline, 1900.0368, precisely because trust in the brand is now worth exploiting

5. Conclusion

Summary: VNeID doesn’t win adoption attribute by attribute like every other example in this deck — it uses regulation to force compatibility directly, sector by sector.

Key lesson, stated as a rule: when a firm or state controls the channel citizens must use anyway (banking rails, e-government portals), diffusion can be legislated, not earned — but that shortcut borrows against public trust, and the bill comes due at the first major failure or breach.

Wrap-up

Diffusion is not automatic — it has to be managed

Technological excellence alone does not guarantee success; commercial victory relies on market adoption. Managers must actively design products and strategies for each adopter segment, not assume the S-curve will climb itself.

Carrying this forward. HụiKeeper (Session 1) and Grab/Be/Xanh SM (Session 2) are both sitting somewhere on this same S-curve. Where would you place each one — and on which of the 5 attributes are they weakest?
← Home